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This article explores the relationship between two prominent varieties of democracy 
and the size of a country’s prison population. Theoretically, it proposes that social 
democracies increase social and economic equality which reduces both the “demand for 
crime” and the number of criminals. Adversarial democracies, on the other hand, generate 
higher levels of inequality and insecurity that lead to higher levels of crime. Utilizing a 
structured, focused comparison of Nordic social democracies and Anglo-American 
adversarial democracies complemented by cross-sectional multiple regression analysis of 
twenty industrialized democracies, I find empirical support for both of these conjectures.  A 
major implication of this study is that states which choose parliamentary democracy, 
proportional representation elections, and a social democratic orientation may have a 
long-lasting positive impact on crime reduction by helping to remedy underlying structural 
causes of political, economic, and social inequality that give rise to criminal behavior.
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This article explores the relationship between the social and the 
adversarial varieties of democracy and the size of a country’s criminal 
population. In particular, it is concerned with the impact of political 
institutions on increasing social cohesion, reducing crime, and setting 
parameters for a more just society. As this article aims to illustrate, political 
institutions including parliamentarism, social corporatism, and electoral laws 
that emphasize proportionality and equality may serve as a vital component 
of a long-term crime reduction strategy by addressing underlying structural 
causes of political, economic, and social inequality that give rise to increased 
crime. By improving overall social respect, trust, and lawfulness, electoral and 
other institutional reforms may provide greater social benefits over time than 
shorter-term punitive approaches that focus primarily on treating the 
symptoms of criminal behavior. 
This paper is structured as follows. The first section presents a literature 
review of political explanations for the wide variation in imprisonment rates 
over time and across countries. I then develop the hypothesis that social 
democracies have an advantage in increasing social and economic equality 
that in turn reduces the “demand for crime” and the number of criminals. On 
the other hand, more adversarial democracies tend to generate greater 
inequality and, therefore, have more prisoners due to higher levels of crime 
and more categories of crime. I then empirically test these hypotheses 
through a structured, focused comparison of four Nordic social democracies 
and four Anglo-American adversarial democracies and a multiple regression 
analysis on twenty industrialized democracies. As discussed below, the 
evidence largely supports these hypotheses.  
Literature Review
Although individuals and governments stand to benefit dramatically 
from crime reduction, actual rates of crime and imprisonment vary widely 
across industrialized democracies. For example, the USA has over two 
million people in prison, whereas Japan has significantly fewer prisoners 
(UNDP 2007; Lacey 2010). One general observation of the literature on 
imprisonment is that neither democratization nor economic prosperity alone 
is sufficient to achieve a low level of crime or incarceration (Wacquant 2009). 
Firstly, low levels of incarceration do not necessarily reflect low crime rates. 
In many developing countries, they simply reflect a high degree of impunity. 
Higher levels of imprisonment may reflect the 1) number of criminalized 
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activities, 2) incidence of crime, 3) length of incarceration, 4) rates of 
imprisonment, and 5) extent to which the state actually punishes criminals 
rather than letting some or most of them go free (Nadanovsky and Cunha-
Cruz 2009; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). 
Secondly, incarceration is not only a measure of law enforcement, it is 
also a penal regime connected to the overall political economy of a country 
(Cavadino and Dignan 2006). Recently, for example, several scholars have 
linked the neo-liberal “variety of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice 2000) found in 
English-speaking countries settled by Anglo-Saxons to a harsher penal 
regime of mass incarceration than that found in the coordinated market 
economies of continental Europe, East Asia, and Scandinavia (Wacquant 
2009; Lacey 2010). 
Scandinavian countries in particular have attracted attention for having 
the lowest average rates of imprisonment among industrialized democracies. 
One line of argument is that they have fewer criminals, because their 
comprehensive “universal welfare states” (Esping-Andersen 1990) have 
explicitly aimed to achieve full (one hundred per cent) employment for the 
entire male and female labor force (Tilton 1992; Whyman 2003). Although 
these countries have not always succeeded in maintaining full employment 
(Pontusson 2005), it is certainly possible that state efforts to increase 
employment have reduced crime as studies have repeatedly found 
unemployment to correlate with the incidence of crime (Western and Pettit 
2010).  
Three other aspects of the universal welfare state may also help to curb 
crime. Firstly, comprehensive national health insurance reduces under-
treatment of mental illnesses and significantly reduces medical costs for those 
with low income or for those who are unemployed. Lack of health insurance 
has been found to positively correlate with imprisonment rates (Selke and 
Andersson 2003). Secondly, the universal welfare state’s provision of extensive 
and free education appears to also reduce crime. Studies have shown that 
more educated citizens commit relatively fewer crimes, whereas young men 
with lower levels of completed schooling commit most crimes (Western 
2007). Thirdly, the efforts of a universal welfare state to provide quality 
education, child care, and health insurance to poor children as well as health 
care and employment to their parents may play a powerful role in reducing 
child abuse, ignorance, and disempowerment, the very factors that often lead 
to crime as young men get older (Loury 2010). 
While Scandinavian countries stand out for their universal welfare states 
and low levels of crime and punishment, it is also true that Scandinavian 
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societies have historically been rather ethnically homogeneous. This may 
have helped to keep crime rates low, as it may be easier to maintain a high 
level of social trust and mutual respect among like-minded peoples. In 
ethnically or racially divided societies, a caste system may develop where 
“superior” groups resent or hate “inferior” groups, thus creating an 
environment of animosity, distrust, and exploitation (Bangura 2006). When 
racial segregation, inter-ethnic animosity, and economic stratification are 
combined with limited social mobility, it can be an incubator of crime and 
harsh penal regimes as in the USA and South Africa (Wacquant 2009; 
Wacquant 2010). For example, studies have found imprisonment rates within 
the USA to increase with the proportion of black residents (Selke and 
Andersson 2003) and the strength of right-wing political parties (Jacobs and 
Carmichael 2001). 
Because economic systems are dependent on political decisions, it may 
be possible to trace a significant share of incarceration differences across 
societies to political institutions that provide (or fail to provide) space for the 
inclusion of the lower classes to organize and participate in political decision-
making. Lacey (2010), for example, argues that proportional representation 
(PR) electoral systems make democracies more inclusive, leading to greater 
redistribution and social equality which, in turn, reduce crime. Similarly, 
Jacobs and Kleban (2003) find that the inclusive procedure of social 
corporatism also reduces incarceration rates, while Arend Lijphart finds 
“consensus” democracies that combine PR elections with corporatism put 
fewer people in prison than “majoritarian” democracies (Lijphart 1999, p. 
298) with adversarial single-member district (SMD) election systems and 
fragmented, non-corporatist, interest group representation. 
 
Hypotheses  
The literature reviewed in the previous section leads us to hypothesize 
that different types of democracy may be closely related to the incidence of 
crime in a society. In particular, one might expect more inclusive 
democracies to have the least crime, because they might also have the least 
number of dissatisfied individuals. This distinction leads us to a comparison 
of two different varieties of democracy as defined below.
Firstly, an “adversarial democracy” can be defined as a democracy in 
which competitive veto points, individualism, and clientelism are dominant 
features of the political system. As Mansbridge (1981, pp. 469-70) argues, “the 
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fully developed adversary theory of representation rejects the assumption of 
an underlying common good…voters pursue their conflicting individual 
interests by making demands on the political system, while politicians, also 
pursuing their own interests, adopt policies that buy them votes.”  This 
variety of democracy is relatively exclusive for three reasons. Firstly, the 
institutional structure incentivizes a combative approach to politics whereby 
influence is gained by simultaneously excluding one’s (perceived) opponents. 
Secondly, the political process is highly commodified, allowing those with the 
greatest ability to pay for lobbyists, access, advertising, and campaigns to have 
a distinct advantage over others. Thirdly, due to the highly competitive and 
costly nature of this system, many come to feel that political participation is 
useless because of the high likelihood of being vetoed at some point in the 
process. Therefore, much of the population gives up on participating in 
formal political processes which result in special and moneyed (i.e., elite) 
interests often winning out over general public interests. 
A “social democracy,” by contrast, can be defined as a democracy that 
emphasizes proportionality, egalitarianism, and collective veto points. As 
Meyer (2007, p. 3) points out, “social democracy…insists that democracy and 
its associated charter of rights must be extended into the social and economic 
spheres as well. Specifically, the social order must meet higher standards of 
democracy by allowing for well-regulated participation, a legal claim to social 
security, a distribution of wealth and income that takes justice into account, 
and a democratic state, the regulative and distributive policies of which 
accord with all of these values.”  Compared to an adversarial democracy, a 
social democracy is relatively inclusive for three reasons. Firstly, the 
institutional structure incentivizes cooperation, compromise, and inclusion 
rather than exclusion of one’s (perceived) opponents in political deliberation. 
Secondly, as an inclusive system, the political process is relatively 
de-commodified, making political influence less dependent on one’s ability to 
pay for lobbyists, access, and campaigns. Thirdly, due to the more accessible 
and cooperative nature of this system, people are more likely to feel that 
political participation is worthwhile because they might actually have some 
influence. More of the population participates in trying to influence the 
political system and, as a result, general public interests more often win out 
over special and moneyed interests in social democracies than in adversarial 
democracies. 
While many institutional analyses highlight the role of “veto players” 
(Tsebelis 2002), the two definitions above incorporate the notion of “veto 
points” building on the work of McGann (2006), Birchfield and Crepaz 
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(1998), and Crepaz (2001) who distinguish “competitive veto points” that 
make policy changes difficult (such as presidentialism, constitutional rigidity, 
judicial review, and bicameralism) from ”collective veto points” which refer to 
power sharing and proportionality within a legislature. As McGann (2006, p. 
180) points out, 
Competitive veto points tend to lead to policy deadlock and immobilism, 
whereas collective veto points enable common policies to be agreed upon 
and implemented. The collective veto points tend to lower income 
inequality as they facilitate government responsiveness to public opinion, 
whereas competitive veto points lead to higher income inequality, as it is 
easier to block redistributive policies. 
From this perspective, “it is very easy to explain why supermajoritarian 
checks and balances increase inequality. Such institutions allow minority 
groups that lose from redistribution to veto it” (McGann 2006, p. 196). 
Comparing these two varieties of democracy leads us to several 
hypotheses. Firstly, we might expect democracies characterized by adversarial 
institutions to have more criminals if these systems generate more inequality 
and, therefore, have more “losers” who decide to resort to crime out of 
desperation. Although “adversarial democracy” is perhaps best understood as 
a radial concept, it can be identified by the presence of multiple adversarial 
political institutions. Among these institutions we will focus on two that are 
particularly important: uninominal elections and presidentialism.   
The first relevant institution, the electoral system, takes on an adversarial 
character when it is uninominal (i.e., based on single-member districts) and 
uses a plurality selection rule as in the UK and many former British colonies 
(including Canada and the USA) (Cole 1999; Finer 1975). Often referred to 
as a “first-pass-the-post” (FPTP) system, these electoral contests are 
adversarial because only one candidate wins in each district while all of the 
other candidates lose (Norris 2004). The election itself, therefore, functions as 
a competitive veto point because all candidates (and the voters and the issues 
they represent) are vetoed at the time of election except for the one candidate 
who happens to gain a plurality of the votes. If, for example, the winning 
candidate gets 40% of the vote while three others respectively get 30%, 20%, 
and 10%, then 60% of the electorate will be unrepresented by a candidate or 
political party of their choosing. Not only does the election itself create many 
losers, but the policies that result may also take on the same character. 
Furthermore, in uninominal systems, electoral competition over time in each 
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district typically centers around two candidates (Duverger 1954), thereby 
excluding all other possible choices. Yet, as Emerson (2007, p. 4) exclaims, 
“Democracy, I repeat, is for everybody. The democratic process, therefore, 
should not be a means by which some come to gain dominance over others 
(as in a majoritarian structure), but rather a process in which all (or nearly 
all) come to an accommodation…So any voting procedure must surely offer 
the voter a choice of more than two options!”
Compared to FPTP systems, an electoral system takes on a more 
inclusive character under high magnitude, multi-member districts using list-
based proportional representation (PR). For example, if the district 
magnitude is ten and the winning party gets 40% of the vote while three 
others get 30%, 20%, and 10%, respectively, then 100% of the electorate will 
be represented by a candidate or political party of their choosing with the 
first party getting four seats and the remaining parties having respective seat 
allocations of three, two, and one. In other words, more parties, and hence 
more perspectives, can be included in a parliament using a proportional 
electoral system (Norris 2004). Moreover, compared to uninominal elections, 
PR has been linked to the election of a greater share of representatives from 
demographic groups typically under-represented in politics including 
women, young adults, working-class people, and ethnic minorities (Joshi 
2012a, 2012b; Norris 2004, 2008). Thus, public policies are likely to 
incorporate the views and interests of more segments of the population than 
under an adversarial system because PR often brings a larger share of 
perspectives and interests into the legislative arena. 
As McGann (2006, p. 181) argues, 
Because there is proportional representation, no single party has a majority, 
and thus it is necessary to make coalitions. There are always multiple 
possible winning coalitions, so it is always possible to break the current 
winning coalition by offering some of its members a better deal. This 
protects minorities and makes intransigence a very risky strategy. If a party 
digs its heels in, it is always possible to make a winning coalition around it, 
rendering the party irrelevant. The only way a party can protect its interests 
is to compromise with other parties. Thus self-interested behavior leads to 
reasonable negotiation.
Precisely because these conditions facilitate cooperation and compromise, 
there may be a greater likelihood that public policies will benefit the general 
public, including the lower classes. This in turn should reduce inequality and 
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crime, which leads us to our first hypothesis (H1) that there will be fewer 
criminals in countries with proportional representation elections than in 
countries with uninominal electoral systems. 
A second institution that fosters adversarial politics is presidentialism. In 
presidential systems there is a division of power between the executive and 
legislative branches of government, creating an inherently adversarial 
relationship as these two branches of government are pit in competition 
against each other for influence and power (Shugart and Carey 1992). The 
adversarialism of presidentialism is often further exacerbated by the fact that 
the president, being independently elected, feels a sense of entitlement to rule 
on his/her own without the consent of the national assembly. Hence, the 
president and the assembly typically have a combative relationship whereby 
presidents often resort to a variety of means to augment their power and 
bypass the legislature such as through proclamations, executive orders, 
decrees, memoranda, national-security directives, and legislative signing 
statements (Nelson 2008, p. 155). Scholars have also found presidents more 
likely to instigate wars or states of emergency to expand presidential power as 
the incumbents become addicted to power (Gulieyev 2009; Linz 1994). 
As Linz (1994) famously argued, presidentialism generates an inherent 
problem of “dual legitimacy.”  Because both the assembly and the president 
are separately elected, it is not clear in whom the voters have vested greater 
power in the case of a conflict arising between the two. Perhaps due to this 
problem, presidential systems have been found to collapse into dictatorship 
more often than parliamentary democracies. Linz (1994) discovered a 77% 
breakdown rate for presidential democracies compared to 33% for 
parliamentary democracies, while Stepan and Skach (1993) found pure 
parliamentary regimes to have a 61% survival rate compared to 20% for pure 
presidential regimes. In a parliament there is a clearer chain of delegation 
whereby voters select members of parliament who, in turn, choose a prime 
minister and cabinet to govern.     
Presidents are also elected in a uninominal process reflecting the 
adversarialism inherent in any single-member district election. A president 
may even come to power with only a plurality of 30% or 40% of the votes, but 
the system is “loser loses all” for defeated presidential candidates and the 
large number of voters they represent (Linz 1994, p. 14). Moreover, the 
winner-take-all character of presidential elections often result in a form of 
“delegated democracy” whereby “candidates compete for a chance to rule 
virtually free of all constraints save those imposed by naked, non-
institutionalized power relations. After the election, voters/delegators are 
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expected to become a passive but cheering audience of what the president 
does…The president and his most trusted advisors are the alpha and the 
omega of politics” (O’Donnell 2009, p. 37). In many presidencies, cabinet 
members are also unelected officers chosen by the chief executive (Nelson 
2008, p. 19). Meanwhile, even defenders of presidentialism acknowledge that 
presidencies are associated with fewer multi-party coalitions and less 
programmatic parties (Cheibub 2007). 
By contrast, parliamentary democracies are less adversarial when it 
comes to the relationship between the executive and the legislative functions 
of government. This is so because the same party or coalition controls both 
branches, and power sharing among multiple parties in an executive cabinet 
facilitates compromise and cooperation. Voters are also more likely to know 
beforehand the policy agenda of a potential government because 
parliamentary systems encourage partisan voting (Gerring and Thacker 
2008). In other words, the focus in elections is more on collective entities 
(parties) as opposed to individuals (presidential candidates), leading to more 
programmatic parties and a more programmatic focus of policy discussion 
(ibid.). From this discussion, we conjecture that the combative nature of 
presidentialism may lead to a smaller share of the population obtaining 
desirable policies than under parliamentarism because the competitive veto 
structure will allow defenders of the status quo more opportunities to veto 
proposals for progressive redistribution. This is likely to be less beneficial to 
those belonging to the lower classes who, out of frustration and desperation, 
may resort to crime. This brings us to our second hypothesis (H2) that there 
will be more criminals in countries with presidentialism than in countries with 
parliamentarism. 
Our third and final hypothesis (H3) is that countries with highly inclusive 
social democracies will have fewer criminals than in adversarial democracies. 
As Friedman and Hochstetler (2002, p. 23) point out, in an “adversarial 
democracy,” 
Citizens are not controlled by state actors, but neither are they assured a 
regular channel of access to political decision making. In addition, the state 
does not protect weaker civil society actors against stronger ones. For 
example, representation through clientelistic networks depends largely on 
citizens’ trade of political support for favors from highly placed elites, who 
are not institutionally bound to represent them. Both pluralism and 
neopluralism are placed in this category. 
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In other words, while adversarial democracies are based on the principles of 
competition and combat, thus producing winners and losers, social 
democracies are based more on the principle of inclusion and shared security 
via universal rights and entitlements with the goal of making everyone a 
winner. 
There are two particular means by which we expect social democracies 
to reduce crime: social equalization and risk-mitigation. The first factor is 
important because there is less demand for crime when all members of 
society have access to a decent basic living standard. When the gap in living 
standards is low, there may also be less feeling of relative status deprivation 
among those with low status (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). Yet, even in 
prosperous societies, there may be high levels of poverty and disaffection if 
the gap between the haves and have-nots of material wealth and status is 
great. The quality of life and the life chances an individual experiences will 
depend upon the opportunities she or he has access to within her/his society. 
When these opportunities are uneven and unequal, it can lead to social 
problems such as crime, drugs, divorce, unemployment, and mental illness. 
Researchers have consistently found strong correlations between higher levels 
of inequality and higher incidences of mental health problems, drug use, 
obesity, educational failure, teenage births, violence, imprisonment, and 
punishment (ibid.).  
As mentioned above, social democracies specifically aim to increase 
social equality (Joshi and Navlakha 2010; Tilton 1992) while seeking to 
deepen democracy by extending political inclusion to the lower classes 
(Berman 2007). They also tend to pursue progressive taxation requiring 
greater social contribution from those with excess to guarantee equal 
opportunities and social mobility to those born at the bottom of the wealth 
pyramid. This is particularly important, for children need to be able to access 
decent nutrition, childcare, education, and a safe environment free from 
criminal gangs, pollution, noise, and violence. As more children are entitled 
to these protections and security, a greater share of the population can gain 
the opportunity to study, acquire skills, work hard, and find gainful 
employment.    
The second and related element through which social democracies can 
reduce crime is through risk-mitigation via social safety nets. Safety nets 
prevent people from facing the fallout of structural injustices. This is 
particularly important in cases such as an environmental catastrophe or 
exogenous economic shock where the victims are not at fault (Meyer 2007). 
Thus, even those members of the population who are employed and healthy 
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know that they will be able to sustain their needs if they were to lose their 
jobs or fall ill due to factors beyond their control (Einhorn and Logue 2003). 
The presence of safety nets can hence potentially improve the overall 
physical, mental, and emotional security of the population. 
Without social equality and risk-mitigation, however, a country may 
find a relatively large portion of its population in deprivation, despair, and 
with increased motivation to engage in criminal behavior. Compared to 
social democracies, this is more likely to be the case in adversarial 
democracies where political institutions exclude or minimize participation of 
the lower classes and, hence, retard the development of social safety nets and 
full employment policies. If the state provides insufficient welfare support to 
its citizens and does not actively promote full employment, its people 
(especially young men) will have more incentives to turn to gangs, drugs, or 
other criminal activities to prop up their identity and livelihood. Including 
groups at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy into democracy may, 
therefore, be especially pivotal for crime reduction because most imprisoned 
criminals come from lower strata of the population.  
  
Empirical Analysis
I will now proceed to test whether these two varieties of democracy 
systematically vary in their rates of imprisonment. First, I employ a 
structured, focused comparison of four Nordic social democracies 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and four English-speaking 
adversarial democracies (Australia, Canada, UK, and USA). I chose to 
compare these states for several reasons:  Firstly, the four social democracies 
rank at the top of Meyer’s social democracy index (Meyer 2007, p. 213) as the 
most “highly inclusive social democracies” among twenty long-standing 
member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Secondly, the four adversarial democracies rank 
towards the bottom of Meyer’s index. Three are classified as “less inclusive 
social democracies” (Australia, Canada, and UK) and one as an “exclusive 
democracy” (USA). Thirdly, as OECD members, these countries have 
comparable data available and are all fairly rich and stable, allowing us to 
control for the impact of economic prosperity and political development, 
factors that otherwise vary greatly across countries.   
As shown in table 1, the difference between these two varieties of 
democracy on rates of imprisonment is stunning. The Nordic social 
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democracies average 75 prisoners per 100,000 people while the Anglo-
American neo-liberal democracies average 274 prisoners, or almost four 
times as many. The USA, as the most exclusive and adversarial of the 
adversarial democracies, stands out with its exceptionally high rate of 
imprisonment at 738 prisoners per 100,000 people, but even if the USA is 
excluded as an outlier, the other adversarial democracies still have an 
incarceration rate that is roughly 60 per cent higher than that of the Nordic 
social democracies.   
As mentioned above, there are fundamental differences in the political 
institutions of these two varieties of democracy. While highly inclusive social 
democracies use proportional representation (PR) elections, adversarial 
democracies use single-member districts (SMD). Adversarial democracies 
themselves can then be further divided into moderately adversarial 
democracies (those with parliaments) and deeply adversarial democracies 
(those with presidents). As shown in table 2, both proportional 
representation (PR) electoral systems and parliamentarism correlate with 
lower levels of imprisonment across these countries. Theoretically, we would 
expect a greater level of inclusion from PR electoral laws because they should 
provide more institutional space for the inclusion of the lower classes in 
political decision-making. Notably, PR systems grant lower-class political 
parties a greater chance of representation in national and sub-national 
legislatures than the winner-take-all SMD electoral system, because parties 
Table 1 
Imprisonment Rates in Selected Social and adversarial Democracies
Country
Electoral 
System
Executive-Legislative 
Relations
Effective Number 
of Political Parties  
Prisoners 
(per 100,000 
population) 
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
PR
PR
PR
PR
Parliamentary
Parliamentary
Parliamentary
Parliamentary
7
7
7
7
77
75
66
82
Australia
Canada
UK
SMD
SMD 
SMD
Parliamentary
Parliamentary
Parliamentary
3
5
3
126
107
124
USA SMD Presidential 2 738
 Sources.—Effective number of parliamentary parties is from Norris, 2009; prisoner 
population is from UNDP, 2009.
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can win assembly seats even with less than a majority of voter support in an 
electoral district. 
Partly due to this fundamental difference in electoral systems, there is a 
large divergence in the party systems as measured by the “effective number of 
parliamentary parties” (ENPP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Norris 2009). 
Whereas the social democracies average seven parties in parliament, the 
adversarial democracies average less than half this amount (3.3 parties). With 
more parties in parliament, there is a greater likelihood that lower-class 
parties will also be included, and among our sample countries those with 
high ENPP are, in fact, more inclusive of lower-class political parties. 
Moreover, there is a clear negative correlation between the number of parties 
in parliament and the average imprisonment rates across these countries. As 
mentioned earlier, the inclusion of multiple parties facilitates building 
consensus because the parties must compromise to pass legislation. It also 
provides an incentive to develop inclusive policies such as universal welfare 
that can guard against the ill effects of unemployment and deprivation, 
factors that may lead to crime. The adversarial states, on the other hand, 
generally have only two or three major political parties and are more likely to 
experience single-party rule without the need to compromise with the 
“opposition.”  
A second relevant dimension of the electoral system relates to 
regulations concerning political party and campaign financing. In all of the 
Nordic social democracies, the government is the primary source of political 
finance as shown in table 2. Rules vary from country to country, but the 
presence of public finance allows lower-class political parties to compete on a 
more even footing with political parties representing the upper class. In 
adversarial democracies, there is less prevalence of public campaign finance 
as can be seen in the case of the United States where political finance is 
largely in private hands. This makes it more difficult for lower-class parties to 
compete in the absence of strong labor unions. 
A third relevant dimension of the electoral system concerns the 
eligibility to vote and the procedures for voter registration. These rules have a 
major impact on who participates in running for office and who participates 
in voting for candidates. Nordic social democracies are particularly inclusive 
in orientation. As displayed in table 2, they all make voter registration 
universal and automatic. In the case of Anglo-American adversarial states, 
however, only two out of four make voter registration automatic. These 
divergent electoral laws lead to major differences in political participation. 
The four Nordic social democracies displayed in table 1 average roughly 79 
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per cent voter turnout, whereas the four adversarial democracies have less 
than 64 per cent voter turnout as a percent of the voting age population 
(VAP). Yet even this figure overstates the case because Australia has 
compulsory voting. Among the three remaining adversarial democracies, 
voter turnout is only 57 per cent, and many of the people who do not turn 
out to vote in these countries belong to the lower social classes (Lijphart 
1997). 
The combination of a proportional representation (PR) electoral system 
with parliamentary government and public funding of political parties 
presumably gives representatives of the lower classes more of a chance to 
enter into the legislature and the ruling coalition. This makes for a more 
inclusive democracy compared to adversarial systems where lower-class 
parties may have inadequate or no representation. Lower-class parties are 
also likely to be under-represented when voter registration is not automatic 
and when there are few or no regulations on private financing of political 
campaigns. In these cases, voters may not even bother to register or to vote. 
With the exception of Australia, this phenomenon regularly occurs in the 
English-speaking adversarial democracies. 
As more inclusive, consensus-oriented political systems, the Nordic 
social democracies have also been able to generate universal welfare states. As 
a result, their income inequality is low as represented by an average Gini 
coefficient of only 25.6. The adversarial democracies have minimal to 
Table 2
Voting Conditions in Selected Social and adversarial Democracies
Country
Variety of 
Democracy
Public Campaign 
Finance
Universal Voter 
Registration
Voter Turnout/
VAP 
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Social
Social
Social
Social
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes 
Yes
Yes
Yes
83.0%
77.2%
76.5%
79.3%
Australia
Canada 
UK
Adversarial
Adversarial
Adversarial
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
83.1%
55.5%
58.3%
USA Extremely 
Adversarial
No No 57.2%
 Sources.—Public campaign finance and voting age population (VAP) turnout comes from 
International IDEA, 2010; voter registration is from Ace Project, 2010.
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moderate welfare states and a much higher Gini of 36.2. These levels of 
inequality correlate highly with imprisonment rates (r = 0.73) across these 
countries as shown in table 3. As mentioned earlier, consensus-building, 
social corporatism, and welfare states appear to play a key role in 
contributing to crime reduction. Lower-class political participation plays an 
important role not only in parliamentary parties but more broadly in political 
organization, cohesion, and solidarity of the lower classes as well. This is 
apparent in labor unionization rates, a primary indicator of lower-class 
organization. 
When labor unions are weak and less able to influence politics through 
the vehicle of a working-class political party as in adversarial democracies, 
the state has little pressure and less incentive to invest in improving the 
working and living conditions of the lower classes. One symptom of this 
process may be a high level of immigration into the country. Rather than 
employers agreeing to pay higher wages or taxes to benefit unionized workers 
as in social democracies, they can recruit employees from overseas to reduce 
their labor costs in adversarial democracies. The business classes can thus 
both avoid paying higher taxes that could fund improvements in the welfare 
of the lower classes as well as take advantage of low-cost politically 
un-organized immigrants. 
Table 3 shows how opportunities for lower-class political parties to be 
included in democratic politics can dramatically transform society by 
reducing crime. In social democracies, labor union density is high. The 
majority of workers can belong to unions because the business community 
does not have hegemonic control over the government. As a result, workers 
can join labor unions free of intimidation and harassment. With high levels 
of unionization, workers are also able to demand higher taxes on the rich and 
a higher level of publicly funded social services. In turn, high levels of social 
services and welfare transfers can cut the poverty rate in half. 
As shown in table 3, on average 69 per cent of the workers in the Nordic 
social democracies belong to a labor union compared to only 23 per cent of 
workers in the English-speaking adversarial democracies. The labor 
unionization rate is exceptionally low at 12% in the USA, the country with 
the highest incarceration rate. By contrast, the proportional electoral system 
in Nordic countries has created space for political parties allied with labor 
unions to come to power, stay in power, and be formidable opposition groups 
within the Parliament when out of power. As a result, these governments 
have been able to collect on average 46% of their GDP in tax revenue. 
Resistance from the much stronger business community in the Anglo-
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American governments has stifled tax efforts so that tax collection is only 
33% of GDP and even less (28%) in the USA. 
The wealthy are able to have more power in the English-speaking 
adversarial democracies because of disproportional and adversarial electoral 
laws and laws that create dependence on private funding and private media 
for political campaigns. Under this system, even if a lower-class political 
party gets 30%-40% of the votes in an electoral district, it usually gets no 
seats. As a result, adversarial democracies levy relatively low taxes on the 
wealthy and, therefore, have less revenue to spend on comprehensive social 
programs that can eliminate, or at least reduce, the root causes of crime. 
The difference in taxation rates means that the Nordic countries can 
support comprehensive welfare states whereas Anglo-American public 
services are more likely to be minimal, miserly, and means-tested (Esping-
Andersen 1990) even though both types of states averaged roughly 
US$40,000 in per capita income in 2008. Whereas public social spending 
makes up 26% of the GDP in Nordic social democracies, it is only 18% in 
adversarial democracies and less than 15% in the USA (Pontusson 2005). 
With such a minimal welfare state, poverty rates in these adversarial 
democracies are over 12%, which is more than double that of the Nordic 
Table 3
equality-enhancing Institutions in Two Varieties of Democracy
Country 2004 Union 
Density 
(% of workers)
2006 Tax 
Revenue 
(% of GDP)
2001 Public 
Social 
Spending 
(% of GDP) 
2005 
Income 
Gini 
2000 
Poverty 
Rate
2008 Per 
Capita 
GNP  
(US$)
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
average
72%
72%
55%
77%
69%
49%
44%
44%
49%
47%
27.7%
23.9%
23.1%
27.5%
25.6%
24.7
26.9
25.8
25.0
25.6
4.3%
6.4%
6.3%
5.3%
5.6%
$37,530
$35,940
$59,250
$37,780
$42,625 
Australia
Canada 
UK
USA
average
22%
30%
29%
12%
23%
31%
33%
37%
28%
32%
17.6%
17.4%
21.5%
14.6%
17.8%
35.2
32.6
36.0
40.8
36.2
11.2%
10.3%
11.4%
17.1%
12.5%
$37,250
$38,710
$36,240
$46,790
$39,748 
 Sources.—OECD, 2012. Immigration rate and Gini coefficient from UNDP, 2009. Per 
capita GNP from World Bank, 2012.
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social democracies where poverty rates are under 6%. Lastly, the poverty rate 
in the most adversarial country, the USA (17.1%), is more than quadruple the 
rate in Denmark (4.3%). 
From a broader perspective, it seems that presidentialism and a 
disproportional electoral system may facilitate the disempowerment of the 
working class and the lower strata in adversarial democracies. Presumably, 
this structural factor helps create a larger breeding and recruiting ground for 
potential criminals in that over ten percent of the population is below the 
poverty line. An additional factor may be the high level of immigration into 
adversarial democracies. Low-strata individuals may be prone to blame 
immigrants for their problems rather than the business community and 
upper classes who may, in fact, be largely at fault for depriving them of 
political space, disempowering them politically and economically, and 
intentionally bringing in immigrants as a way of keeping overall wage 
pressures down.
Moreover, in adversarial democracies where restrictive and 
disproportional political institutions tend to marginalize or exclude lower-
class parties, the level of union membership may also remain low. When the 
workers have less power, capital dominates. As a result, tax collection is lower, 
as is the level of publicly funded social services for the lower classes. In this 
system, workers are at a disadvantage and more likely to fall into poverty 
because there is less of a safety net to prop them up. This approach has a 
“winner-take-all” quality for those with great wealth because they pay 
relatively lower taxes and do not have to bear the burden of lifting up what 
becomes a considerably large pool of disadvantaged, impoverished, and 
disillusioned people at the bottom. Ignored by what they perceive to be 
callous and indifferent elites, some sections of the large lower strata, 
especially a portion of the young males, become involved in criminal 
activities. This happens throughout the Anglo-American states where 
punishment becomes a means of “disciplining the poor” to accept their 
position within the socio-economic and racial hierarchy of society 
(Wacquant 2009). 
In this regard, the USA stands out as a deeply adversarial democracy, 
one that has experienced explosive growth in imprisonment since the 1970s. 
In the year 2000, 32.4% of black men in the USA aged 20 to 40 who had 
dropped out of high school had spent time in prison (Western 2007). Such a 
high level of incarceration has led to a vicious cycle whereby those 
incarcerated typically have no employment while imprisoned and few 
employment opportunities upon their release. Their families and children 
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live on the margins of poverty, physical and emotional abuse is high, and 
recidivism is also high, increasing the likelihood of these children falling into 
crime. This is even more so the case due to the criminalization of drug use, 
which is one of the few means poor minorities have at their disposal to 
escape (temporarily) the difficulties of living at the bottom of a stratified 
social, economic, and racial hierarchy. 
Thus far, our structured, focused case comparison has found initial 
confirmation in support of our three hypotheses regarding the positive 
impacts of parliamentarism, PR elections, and social democracy on reducing 
crime. To conduct a larger test of these hypotheses, we now utilize multiple 
regression analysis on the twenty industrialized democracies for which Meyer 
(2007) has tabulated a comprehensive “social democracy index.”  As shown in 
figure 1, these countries vary from a rate of 60 to 200 prisoners per 100,000 
population, with the exception of the USA where the rate is over 700. We use 
Meyer’s index because it is the only major cross-national measure of the 
degree to which countries are social democratic. The index includes nine 
dimensions of social democracy: social and economic rights, universalistic 
social welfare state, social expenditure, coordinated market economy, 
co-determination, relative poverty rate, social stratification in the education 
system, labor-force participation rate, and income equality.
As shown in table 4, our regression models use imprisonment rates (as a 
share of the population) as the dependent variable. In model 1, we included 
three variables related to each of the hypotheses stated above. Both the social 
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Fig. 1.—Prisoners per 100,000 population (2008) (Source: UNDP, 2009).
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democracy index (a continuous variable with a minimum of 0 and maximum 
of 25) and parliamentarism (a dichotomous variable) were statistically 
significant and negatively related to (i.e., reduce) imprisonment while 
electoral system type (dichotomously defined as partly to fully proportional 
or fully SMD) was statistically insignificant. To control for other possible 
Table 4 
Multiple Regression analysis: Imprisonment Rates (2008) 
Model 1 – 
Imprisonment 
Rates 
Model 2 – 
Imprisonment 
Rates 
Model 3 – 
Imprisonment 
Rates 
Democracy Variables    
Social democracy index -2.935 
(1.436)*
-2.642 
(1.436)*
-2.488 
(1.435)
Parliamentarism -599.622 
(35.222)***
-619.259 
(34.219)***
-689.1 
(73.34)***
Proportional representation 2.759 
(17.683)
21.06 
(17.496)
13.10 
(18.9)
Control Variables    
Urbanization rate  1.472 
(.619)**
1.226 
(.657)*
Population density    -.046 
(.045)
-.023 
(.05)
Per capita income (PPP)    -1.604 
(.904)*
-1.817 
(.921)*
Total population in large cities   -.000 
(.000)
Intercept 746.804 
(29.364)***
702.121 
(67.856)***
804.0  
(116.4)***
(n) 20 20 20 
Residual std. error 29.05 24.98 24.83 
Multiple R2 .966 .980 .982 
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .10.
** p < .05. 
*** p < .01.
248 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 41 No. 2, December 2012
factors, we included in model 2 an array of control variables taken from the 
World Bank (2012) for population density, degree of urbanization, and per 
capita income as measured by purchasing power parity. Once again, 
parliamentarism and social democracy were negatively correlated with 
imprisonment, a finding that was statistically significant. Lastly, we included 
an additional control variable for the total number of residents living in 
metropolitan areas in model 3. This allowed us to control for the total 
population level of a country, as small countries may have an advantage in 
reducing crime. In this model, parliamentarism was still highly statistically 
significant, while the social democracy index fell to a level just below 
conventional levels of statistical significance (p < .11). In this model, as in 
model 2, the rate of urbanization (positive) and per capita income (negative) 
were also statistically significant.
Conclusion
In this paper, we found general support for the notion that highly 
inclusive social democracies have fewer criminals than less inclusive 
adversarial democracies. The scope conditions of this inquiry, however, were 
limited. We only examined industrialized democracies, and the conditions 
present in these countries may not parallel those of developing and non-
democratic countries. Therefore, further research is needed to see whether 
these findings also apply to less developed states.
Nevertheless, among the industrialized democracies analyzed here, the 
most striking finding was the strong and positive correlation between 
presidentialism (a strong indicator of adversarial democracy) and high rates 
of imprisonment. Conversely, we found social democracy to correlate 
negatively with imprisonment. We also found states with smaller populations 
to generally have a smaller share of prisoners. Although our findings 
regarding uninominal and proportional electoral systems were not 
statistically significant, we did find overall support for the notion that 
adversarial democracies have more crime, whereas states with parliaments 
and a social democratic orientation have less crime. 
One possible implication of this study is that states which focus on 
developing inclusive democracies can contribute positively to crime 
reduction and democratic deepening by providing more political space and 
opportunities to the lowest classes to participate in making the rules of the 
game for society. On the other hand, established democracies that put up 
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barriers against the inclusion of the lower classes and lower-class political 
parties may witness significantly more incarceration and higher rates of 
crime.  
The key to democratic deepening may, therefore, not be pro forma 
elections alone, but a deep level of inclusion of all strata of society into the 
political process (Heller 2000). Importantly, there must be opportunities for 
the lower and marginalized strata in society to participate actively in 
governance so that people from the lower classes can be elected into positions 
of power or be able to influence those in power. This may not only be crucial 
for raising the living standards of those at the bottom, but also for increasing 
social respect and opportunities for the lower classes. Including groups at the 
bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy into democracy may be especially 
pivotal for crime reduction because most crimes involving long-term prison 
sentences are committed by those from lower socio-economic strata. Hence, 
a key reform for political leaders and activists in industrialized democracies 
may be to transform their political institutions to be more inclusive of the 
lower classes.
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